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LITERATURE REVIEW
Defining Mass Incarceration
What has taken place in the United States has been unprecedented; the criminal justice
system has incarcerated the largest percentage of its population than any nation on the planet; yet
it is had become a normal life event for some racial groups (Justice, 2014). Mass incarceration
has been at the forefront of the news lately; a simple Google search of the terms will yield
56,000 news results and well over one million web results. White House policy initiatives are
even being put in place to combat the effects of mass incarceration ("A Drug Policy for the 21st
Century"); this has not always been the case however. This pushback against the carceral
phenomenon is a fairly recent movement. Mass incarceration has been described in many ways:
a revolution, an epidemic, a collapse and a new Jim Crow (Alexander, 2010, p. 11). David
Garland defined mass incarceration as a rate of imprisonment that is a historical norm for the
society and produces a systematic imprisonment of a whole subgroup of the population (Western
& Wildeman, 2009). Drucker goes a step further and distinguishes incarceration from mass
incarceration. He defines incarceration plainly as “punishment by imprisonment” while defining
mass incarceration as the “result of policies that support the large scale use of imprisonment on a
sustained basis for political or social purposes that have little to do with law enforcement”
(Drucker, 2013, p. 41).
Incarceration on a National Scale
When compared to other countries, the differences are stark. In 2015, the World Prison
Brief released the World Prison Population list which revealed that the Unites States imprisons
and jails more than 2.2 million individuals and comes in with the second highest prison
population rate in the world at 698 prisoners per 100,000 (Walmsley, 2016). As of The World
Bank’s total, the United States population exceeds 318 million (Population, n.d.). This rate is
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second to Seychelles, a tiny island nation in the Indian Ocean, which has 799 prisoners per
100,000; Seychelles has a population just under 100,000 (Walmsley, 2016; Population, n.d.).
When comparing the United States to other countries such as China or Canada, the differences
are still as stark and alarming. China’s prison population is at a rate of 119 per 100,000 while
Canada imprisons 106 individuals per 100,000; these figures still pale in comparison to the
United States (Walmsley, 2016). How did we as a nation get to this point where our prison
population surpasses that of other industrial nations?
Data on the penal population in the United States revealed that between 1925 and 1973,
the incarceration rates in the country were approximately 100 per 100,000, which was equal to
that of our European counterparts (Western & Wildeman, 2009). In 1973, the Rockefeller Drug
Laws were passed in New York after Governor Nelson Rockefeller denounced rehabilitative
efforts put forth to address drug abuse (Drucker, 2013, p. 53). Before proposing the Draconian
drug laws, Rockefeller championed several rehabilitative initiatives designed to tackle drug
addiction; they all yielded mixed or unmeasurable results in their short tenure. The public panic
surrounding the perceived drug epidemic, the sentiment that the issue was not being addressed
quickly enough, and Rockefeller's presidential aspirations have been speculated as the reasons
that led to the denouncement of rehabilitative policies (Kohler-Hausmann, 2010). The statutes,
which later became the model for national policy, mandated that being convicted of possessing
four or more ounces of cocaine or heroin be punished a minimum of 15 years to life in prison.
Gov. Rockefeller’s “tough on crime” agenda apparently worked politically; the policy began to
spread like wildfire to other states and the effect was substantial. Subsequently, the penal
population in the country began to skyrocket as a result of a turn towards more the more punitive
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policies in regard to drug offenses. From 1975 to the end of 2005, the rate of incarceration
through prison and jail rose from 111 to 491 per 100,000 (DeFina & Hannon, 2013).
Disparities in Mass Incarceration
The African-American community has seen the brunt of the increase in the prison
population; African-Americans and Hispanics now account for approximately two-thirds of the
state prison population. Between 1980 and 2000, the rate of incarceration for African-Americans
grew 370% while for Caucasian-Americans it grew 334% (Justice, 2014). Racial disparities in
incarceration existed even before the Rockefeller Drug Laws were enacted but after the laws
were enacted, minority males were incarcerated 12 to 14 times more than Caucasian-Americans
(Jacobson & Chancer, 2010). Considerations for how this level of incarceration impacts the
African-American community are warranted given the sheer number of individuals incarcerated
and how the lion’s share of those incarcerated belong to a certain demographic. If the
incarceration rates remain the same, an African-American male born in 2010 has a one in three
chance of being incarcerated (Jacobson & Chancer, 2010).
Imprisonment became the go-to method in “managing” a troublesome population and as
data show, that population was young, low-income, minority men. These men range from 18-to35 years old with, on average, less than eleven years of education (Western & Wildeman, 2009).
With the prevalence of mass imprisonment, life-course scholars considered the idea that
incarceration on a massive scale such as in the United States can signify a change in the lifepathway for young adult men. In modern times the signaling of adulthood meant progressing
from school to work, then to marriage and establishing a family. Under mass incarceration, a
multitude of young men are “off-track” and risk the chance of not entering into a conventional
adulthood; imprisonment essentially alters the life course (Pettit & Western, 2004). Pettit and
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Western (2004) found that prison becomes a common life event, like a rite of passage such as
getting a license, for black non-college men.
In The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander argues that mass incarceration is another form
of the systemic suppression of African-Americans (Alexander, 2010, p. 12). She argues that the
criminal justice plays an active role in this phenomenon by acting as a gateway into a system of
racial stigma by disproportionately incarcerating men of color. Like many scholars, she points to
the War on Drugs as being the leading culprit in mass incarceration.
The War on Drugs
A fierce media campaign aimed at providing the public with visuals of the devastation of
crack cocaine began in the early 1980s (Alexander, 2010). Under the Reagan administration, the
penalties for the sale and possession of drugs increased more than they had in previous years.
What followed the War on Drugs was increasing support for ‘tough on crime’ politics; policy
changes by the nation’s leaders that have played an integral role in the perpetuation of the
carceral dilemma. During this time, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act was passed which imposed
mandatory minimum sentences for offenses (Alexander, 2010, p. 53-54). At a time that
employment opportunities for unskilled laborers were in sharp decline, the drug trade provided a
revenue stream that called for little skill and returned a profit higher than a conventional job
would yield men in the 1980s; it was the urban ghetto dream. In 1994 President Bill Clinton
signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act into law. The bill allotted almost ten
billion dollars for the construction of prisons and introduced the federal three-strike’s law for
third-time federal felons (Western & Wildeman, 2009). Aggressive policing tactics such as
undercover operations and street sweeps were underway. Poor urban communities that were
filled with minority men bore the brunt of these aggressive policing tactics and punitive policies.
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This perfect storm had been brewing: with the coupling of a Draconian drug policy and a lack of
gainful employment we saw the exodus of minority men from urban communities and into
prisons in historic numbers.
The implications of War on Drugs policies were not apparent overnight; mass
incarceration was a gradual process that was supported by community members as public
opinion called for more punitive sanctions to combat the “rising crime rates.” Many in the
minority communities who had been victimized by crime supported tough on crime policies
without fully understanding the larger impact those policies would have on their communities.
As previous recorded data has shown, there was a long increase in Part I and other serious crimes
in the late 1960s, a plateau in the late 1970s and 1980s, followed by a crime decline for which no
one cause has been found. In 1960, violent crime rates in the United States were at 160.9 per
100,000; by 1969 violent crime rose to 328.7 per 100,000. Crime then fluctuated until its decline
in the mid-1990s. According to the aggregated data presented by the Disaster Center which was
pulled from the Uniform Crime Reports, in 1990 the violent crime rate per 100,000 was 731.8
but by the end of the decade, the violent crime rate declined to 506.5 per 100,000. By 2010, the
reported violent crime rate had fallen to 404.5 per 100,000 (United States Crime Rates, 19602014).
The ‘tough on crime’ era led to harsh mandatory sentencing guidelines that were applied
to non-violent low-level drug offenders. The longer sentences imposed by the drug laws kept the
prisons filled longer and with the “three strikes” component, fewer inmates were being released.
Another byproduct of the War on Drugs is probation; the rules of probation revocation are so
trivial and plentiful that failure to comply is a constant which leads to rearrests. Parole also has
perpetuated the cycle; Alexander holds that parole is the reason the population of prisons steadily
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increased; 35% to 40% of all admissions to prison are due to parole violations (Alexander, 2010,
p. 93; Drucker, 2013, p. 66). Ducker corroborates this argument, holding that the mechanism of
parole in this country is evidence for the claim that mass incarceration may never end as it
maintains the size of the carceral population (Drucker, 2013, p. 66). With such a destructive but
continuous cycle, one has to wonder how the caging of millions of citizens impacts our
communities.
National Impacts of Mass Incarceration
The impact of mass incarceration on the family structure was not seen immediately, but
the ballooning of prison population that is overwhelmingly comprised of African-American
males began to have a profound effect. Imprisonment altered the life course of offenders and the
fallout of that altered life course was a reduction in marriage that coincided with an increase in
single parent households headed by the mothers. From 1980 to 2000, the number of children
with incarcerated fathers increased six-fold from approximately 350,000 to over 2 million
(Western & Wildeman, 2009). The concentration of children without a parent due to mass
incarceration falls most heavily on the African-American community with 10.4% of children
having a father in prison or jail as of 2000. Contrast this against Caucasian-American children
who dealt with a fraction of missing fathers, 1.2% and Hispanics who felt the sting of 3.5% of
fathers in incarceration (Western & Wildeman, 2009). Children who have incarcerated parents
have a greater risk of experiencing mental and behavioral problems (Hatzenbuehler, Keyes,
Hamilton, Uddin, & Galea, 2015). It is common that they experience confusion, sadness, and
social stigma among other things such as low self-esteem, aggressive behavior, and other forms
of emotional issues (Petersilia, 2001). In order to measure the impact of incarceration on
parents, Drucker and Barrera developed a tool called the “criminal justice calendar” that allowed
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correlation of the separation of parent and child with other episodes in the child’s life. They
found that on average, incarcerated parents were separated from their children for 36% of their
lives. That’s a substantial proportion to miss and a loss of presence during the critical
developmental years (Drucker, 2013, p. 149).
With ongoing deindustrialization throwing the economy in flux, labor markets were in
trouble; young men who were essentially unskilled and uneducated were left to fend for
themselves and their families. With the loss of jobs, those with less education were hit the
hardest; especially people of color. Unemployment rates rose to 30% for young black men that
were high school dropouts and for those who graduated from high school, rates rose to 20%.
Social programs such as welfare were not well enough equipped to handle the massive impact of
job loss at that time and could not retrain and supplement incomes for these young men fast
enough. Had the unemployment and education rates not fallen during that time, the growth of
prison admission rates would probably have been reduced by 25% by 2001. One of the side
effects of joblessness was public idleness; this idleness turned to petty offenses, drug use and
drug trade (Western & Wildeman, 2009). This domino effect helped push the African-American
population from poverty to mass incarceration. The crime policies of this country ensured that
once you are in the criminal justice system you are unlikely to get out. These data provide a
snapshot of social dysfunction marked by the impact of deindustrialization and the movement of
jobs as well as the effect of education on deviance and subsequent imprisonment in urban
communities.
Tied into poverty, we find a label that prevents ex-offenders from rising out of such
perils. When released, offenders are generally returned to the community from which they left
and this is usually a poor, inner-city neighborhood. Released ex-offenders have spent 27 months
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incarcerated on average as of 1998 with an expectation that the trend would continue. This
lengthy time spent incarcerated means that those who reenter will have a more difficult time
integrating back into the free community after being so distant for so long (Petersilia, 2001).
When released into the free community ex-offenders face a stigma of being labeled as a criminal
(or felon) and find themselves jumping through a myriad of hoops in order to secure gainful
employment that will allow them to effectively support their families. Previous studies have
found that there’s been a reduction in prisoner participation in programs that address work and
education while incarcerated. In 1991, 31% of inmates who were set to be released reported that
they had participated in vocational programs and 43% had participated in educational programs.
In 1997 those figures dropped to 27% participating in vocational programs and 35% participating
in educational programs (Lynch & Sabol, 2001). In 2003, 29% of inmates reported participating
in a vocational program but more reported being on a waiting list (Greenberg, Dunleavy, &
Kutner, 2007). The lack of availability of in-prison programming could lie at the center of the
problem of returning citizens being unskilled and uneducated. There are vital programs that are
needed to better prepare individuals to successfully become contributing members of society
once they are released, such as completing a basic high school education; in 2003, 43% of
prisoners had a GED or high school diploma before entering prison, 19% completed a GED
while imprisoned and 5% were in the course of completing a GED (Greenberg, Dunleavy, &
Kutner, 2007).
As Alexander (2010) holds, once a person is labeled a felon they are treated as secondclass citizens and legally discriminated against. Ex-offenders are released and find that they face
the “invisible punishments” that keep them from voting, serving on juries, finding meaningful
jobs, housing and obtaining social benefits. Unfortunately, because of the perils that they face,
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persons released from prison remain uneducated, unskilled and most likely without any support.
These difficulties lead to higher chances of failure to reintegrate, which undoubtedly means
rearrest for many; two-thirds of all those released on parole will be rearrested within three years
(Petersilia, 2001). What mass incarceration has left in its wake is a debilitating label; a label that
marginalizes and locks a large group of people out of mainstream society. What I essentially
equate to branding disproportionately hurts low-income, minority men as they are
overrepresented in the penal population. Incarceration and the histories of personal and social
misfortunes that send people to prisons continually punish the offender and their loved ones for
many years beyond the prison sentence.
Scholars have undertaken the task of assessing mass incarceration’s economic impact.
The country has seen purported economic growth yet there is an epidemic of poverty; this
“nagging social issue” has persisted for the past 30 years (DeFina & Hannon, 2013). While the
country’s poverty rates fell a measly 0.3 percentage points from 13% to 12.7% between 1980
and 2004, the gross domestic product actually doubled. Though scholars have pointed to factors
such as globalization, de-unionization, immigration and technological changes as reasons for a
slow decreasing poverty rate in the face of economic growth, they cannot collectively explain the
phenomenon. What the authors propose is that the overwhelming rates of imprisonment in recent
decades are the likely culprit. They propose two possible ways in which mass incarceration
increases poverty.
First, mass incarceration removes individuals from society and classifies them as an
“institutionalized population,” which is not counted in the poverty rates when done by the U.S.
Census and Current Populations Survey (CPS). The second way that mass incarceration
increases poverty but masks poverty rates is through the removal of the breadwinners or heads of
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the household. The families of these individuals who contribute a substantial amount to the
household income are left in poverty when their loved one is imprisoned (DeFina & Hannon,
2013). Essentially, the heads of the households are either physically removed from the
households that are being counted in the poverty rates or those who should be counted in the
poverty rate are classified as a population that is not included in the Census count.
Mass incarceration’s economic implications are not solely calculated in deficits either.
Prisons, which are located in rural communities, provide an economic boost for these
communities so there is little surprise that the rural communities depend on the economics of
prison expansion, a byproduct of mass incarceration. These communities have a vested interest
in the expansion and sustainability of prisons. In 2010, the nation spent over $50 billion on
corrections with a 52% recidivism rate that was seen over three years’ time (Jacobson &
Chancer, 2010). With the ineffective policies that sustain mass incarceration, the ravaging
impacts of over-incarceration and the expenses associated it is important to take a closer look at
what’s taking place locally. This body of work localizes the focus of mass incarceration on one
of the most unique cities in the country, Detroit, Michigan.
The Motor City
Detroit was once a booming place to live that was categorized as a prosperous melting
pot; it was the center of mass automotive production that really began to explode in the 1940s
(Thompson, 2013; Sugrue, 2005, p.19). This automotive boom changed the shape of Detroit
racially, politically, and socially; the city was a battleground for race and space. After a period of
job growth led by manufacturing, the impact of deindustrialization in the 1950s and began to hit
the city along with political and social issues, which all led to the exodus of primarily white
residents and white-owned businesses. Detroit is a unique city that faced the same issues as other
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comparable large cities, so it is interesting to study mass incarceration and explore its attending
issues on a local level. Other large urban cities have experienced what Detroit has, but not to the
same degree and intensity in massive loss of tax base and residents.
In order to tell the story of Detroit and how it came to its current state, scholars point to
the massive influx of African Americans from the South to the North known as the Second Great
Migration. As the labor markets expanded in the north, African-Americans moved primarily after
World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII). In a six-decade period from 1910 to 1970, 6.5
million African Americans moved to the north; 5.5 million of those individuals migrated after
1940.
Figure 1: Data Visualization of the The Great Migration

United States Census Bureau. (2012). Data Visualization of The Great Migration, 1910 to 1970.

With an influx of residents during the Great Migration, tensions began to rise and the politics of
race came front and center for both black and white Detroiters. Initially, the issue that plagued
Detroiters was the issue of public housing as the Second Great Migration began and brought a
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stream of blacks from the South who needed homes and believed that integration would be an
easy feat in the North (Thompson, 1999). Previous to the 1940s, communities and neighborhoods
within the city had been defined by ethnic boundaries. As the population demographics changed
and more African-Americans migrated into the city, ethnic communities began to disappear and
the city was more defined by black and white. Sugrue notes, “Residents of Detroit’s white
neighborhoods abandoned their ethnic affiliations and found a new identity in their whiteness”
(Sugrue, 2005, p. 23). African-Americans had already been migrating to Detroit during World
War I trying to break free of the Jim Crow oppression of the south. As they arrived in the city
they settled primarily on the City’s lower east side in the neighborhoods of “Black Bottom” and
“Paradise Valley.” The incoming African-Americans incited fear in Detroit’s whites who
responded by refusing to sell homes and threatening violence to those trying to move out of the
residential confines set for them (Sugrue, 2005, p. 24). A famous example given is the incident
of Ossian Sweet, an African-American physician who shot into a crowd of irate whites who
surrounded his newly purchased home in a white neighborhood in 1925; Sweet was later
acquitted (Sugrue, 2005, p. 24). While the African-American community fought for housing
options outside of the lower east side, the job market for minorities expanded with initiation of
World War II.
The Manufacturing Boom
The early 1940s saw a boom in the industrial times with a 40% increase in manufacturing
employment in the city. World War II meant that there was a heavy demand for industrial goods
and the automakers rose to meet such demands by producing military hardware. Unemployment
in Detroit fell drastically between 1940 and 1943 with the number of unemployed workers
falling from 135,000 to only 4,000 (Sugrue, 2005, p. 19). With more African-Americans on the
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job force, racial tensions continually rose and came to a boil in June 1943, with a race riot taking
place in Detroit which left 34 people dead of whom 25 were black, and 675 serious injuries
before federal troops were called to action. In the wake of the deadly riot, the Mayor’s Interracial
Committee was formed and other large cities followed suit (Sugrue, 2005, p. 30). AfricanAmericans faced barriers to gainful employment because of discriminatory hiring practices.
Racial discrimination was present but Sugrue notes that there was no clear-cut way to explain the
inequalities in the workplace. He contributes that racial ideology, culture, politics, labor market
structures, and internal firm dynamics all helped to shape African-American employment
patterns (Sugrue, 2005, p. 92). Until 1955, when Michigan passed the Fair Employment Practices
Law, advertisements for job openings would designate racial preference. Sugrue provides the
figures for percentage of job postings with racial preference included; in 1946, 35.1% included
discriminatory clauses; the number continued to rise with 1947 seeing 44.7%, and 1948 seeing
65%. The racial restrictions on jobs availability were felt as there was a surplus of jobs being
unfilled yet there was labor shortage. In 1951 there were 508 unskilled jobs, 423 semiskilled
jobs, and 719 skilled jobs available through the Michigan State Employment Service (MSES) yet
there were 874 unskilled, 532 semiskilled, and 148 skilled black applicants (Sugrue, 2005, p. 94).
With activism, legislation, and unions the labor market gradual began to expand for AfricanAmericans but ironically it took place at a time when the job market began to dwindle.
Deindustrialization in Detroit
The 1950s was a significant period in Detroit because the impact of deindustrialization
began to affect the city; indeed, Detroit’s economy experienced four recessions between 1949
and 1960. When the factories in the heart of the city began to close, surrounding businesses
closed with them as a significant number of them depended upon the employees who were no
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longer there to spend their wages. The surrounding neighborhoods began to lose residents as
plant employees no longer needed to be in close proximity to their jobs; the residents were
largely white. According to Sugrue, between 1947 and 1963, the city lost 134,000 manufacturing
jobs, yet the population of working men and women had increased leaving more labor shortages.
To paint the picture vividly, 56% of all automobile employment in the United States was in
Michigan in 1950; a decade later that number had fallen to 40%. Following the closure of
automobile factories was the closure of auto-related industries which comprised 20% of Detroitarea workers and was the second largest employer in the city. The removal of factories from the
city-center were corporate decisions based on anti-unionism and a power-struggle over worker
control; all the while they downplayed the significant job loss the removal of factories would
bring (Sugrue, 2005, p. 130).
Deindustrialization raised political questions about rights, responsibilities, power, and
inequality. Unions and civil rights activists attempted to combat the effects of deindustrialization
for workers. On a national level, mainstream economists touted the era as one of growth in gross
domestic product, consumer buying power, and industrial output, though locally the city of
Detroit did not project that picture. Some labor Democrats saw the problems of
deindustrialization and proposed legislation in 1955 to deal with the depressed areas. The Area
Redevelopment Acts were vetoed by President Eisenhower twice however (Sugrue, 2005, p.
155). When jobs moved out of the city, it created a spatial issue for African-Americans who were
unable to travel to the rural and suburban areas for work; left behind were poor AfricanAmericans and angry whites who grew more defensive of territory within the city in light of their
inability to flee the city—the battle for space continued in the neighborhoods of the city (Sugrue,
2005, p. 177).
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The Fight for Space
With a massive movement of people came the need for housing, but the needs of the
black population were resisted. African-Americans came in droves with applications for public
housing during World War II but only 1,731 of 14,446 of black applicants were placed in
housing (Sugrue, 2005, p. 58). The issue of housing persisted throughout the 1940s as the city’s
population increased by 220,000 between 1940 and 1950; two-thirds (150,000) of those migrants
were African-Americans (Sugrue, 2005, p. 43). As of 1947 there were 545,000 housing units
available yet only 47,000 were available to African-Americans, which does not account for the
units that may have been out of price range for lower income families. Proposals for the
construction of housing projects outside of the densely packed ghetto were staunchly opposed.
African-Americans were routinely being shut out of the housing market, forced to pay more for
rental units and unable to repair deteriorating properties because of the unwillingness of banks to
grant loans to blacks.
White Detroiters were not alone in shutting out African-Americans trying to move to less
densely packed areas; well-to-do African-American families supported restrictive covenants that
kept poor black families out – classism began to form within the African-American race. In
addition to being unable to afford some housing, African-Americans faced restrictive covenants
that were perpetuated by public policy through federal housing policies and rating systems that
marked blacks as undesirable or high-risk using actuarial measures to make these determinations
(Sugrue, 2005, p. 45). Densely packed areas like Black Bottom began to overflow and residents
sought housing elsewhere; the city’s lower east side was 90% black (Babson, 1986). During his
administration, Mayor Albert Cobo called for the demolition of buildings in black Bottom which
displaced 2,000 residents; this pattern of urban renewal was repeated throughout the city to pave
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the way for highways, industrial parks, and medical centers in areas previously occupied by lowand-moderate income housing for a primarily African-American population (Babson, 1986).
Even with tensions running high, black Detroiters believed that the issues surrounding
integration and housing could be resolved peacefully (Thompson, 1999). This belief stemmed
from the idea that the North was much different than the South and there was active civil rights
leadership present in Detroit. There seemed to be some hope when in 1948 the United States
Supreme Court ruled that racial covenants cannot be enforced by states in Shelley v. Kraemer.
After the Shelley decision, African-Americans began to move beyond the racial borders and into
predominantly white neighborhoods. Between 1940 and 1950, the number of census tracts with
500 or more African-Americans increased from 56 to 73; the number of census tracts increased
from 73 to 166 from 1950 to 1960. The change in the type of housing African-Americans resided
in changed; between 1948 and 1960, the number of African-Americans living in substandard
buildings decreased from 29.3% to 10.3%. In addition, the number of overcrowded homes
decreased from 25.3% to 17.5%; residential segregation was still prevalent, however, as class
divisions began to form and become more prominent. African-Americans who could afford to,
moved out of the city center away from the poverty stricken lower east side while those who
could not afford to move stayed behind. The black elite were the first to leave the city center
followed by the black working class. Home ownership for the working class was unsteady,
however, due to the economic restructuring taking place as the manufacturing industry declined
in the city (Sugrue, 2005, p. 197).
What took place as a result was that the African-American population became distributed
in “concentric circles” where the poorest live in the center and wealth increased as they move out
from the center of the circle. As the able left, class divisions deepened and elite African-
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Americans resisted lower income African-Americans moving into “their neighborhoods”; the
divisions were a manifestation of the housing market, status, and class consciousness of the wellto-do blacks (Sugrue, 2005, p. 203). Whites in the city however believed that segregation was the
best way to keep the peace; the push for total integration by black Detroiters was perceived as
worsening racial relations.
Racial Perspective
White Detroiters continued to fight for housing segregation by forming neighborhood
associations; between 1943 and 1965 Detroit whites founded approximately 192 of the grassroots
organizations in an effort to retain racial homogeneity. Sugrue discussed how home ownership
was tied to identity of residents and was their major financial investment, making them
protective of those investments. The issue of race and the issue of housing were one and the
same to white Detroiters, so blacks moving into the same neighborhood were perceived as a
threat to their investments. In defense of not wanting African-Americans to move into their
neighborhoods, white Detroiters pointed to Paradise Valley and other predominantly black
neighborhoods in the poor city center and believed that the condition in which they resided were
a product of their irresponsibility and not the social and political issues that kept them confined
in slum areas (Sugrue, 2005, p. 216).
Kornhauser conducted a survey that found that the two most pressing issues to whites
was housing and second to that, race relations. White residents were primarily unfavorable to
integration with 54% responding as so; 18% responded favorably to full access being granted to
African-Americans; 68% of white Detroiters were in favor of some form of segregation (Sugrue,
2005, p. 215). These sentiments were coming from residents of a state that had passed a Civil
Rights Act in 1885 (George, 1885). In 1950, Detroit’s metropolitan area had a population of
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3.016 million with 61.3% of the population living in the city of Detroit. Of the black population
of metropolitan Detroit, 83.8% resided in the city and made up 16.2% of the city population.
Total employment of the metro Detroit area in 1950 was 1.193 million with almost half of the
jobs being in manufacturing (McDonald, 2014). With a mix of black and white Detroiters now
living and working together, race relations became a concern. In a survey of Detroit residents
taken by the Detroit Board of Commerce in 1951, neither black nor white Detroiters saw race as
an issue that could not be overcome yet recognized that race was still something to be concerned
about. Of those polled, 47% of white Detroiters and 41% of black Detroiters thought that
“Negro-white Relations was in the top-three issues that were most important to do something
about in Detroit” (Thompson, 1999, p. 169). Further, 20% of whites and 26% of blacks felt as
though race relations was the top issue that needed to be addressed in the city. While the
community members, both black and white, were in sync with what issues needed to be
addressed, they differed on how to bring substantial change to the city of Detroit.
When asked about the reasons race relations may not be as good as they should be at the
time, 27% of whites responded that the issue lay with African-Americans moving into
predominantly white neighborhoods. Approximately 22% of white Detroiters thought that
African-Americans enjoyed too many rights and privileges; 14% believed that AfricanAmericans had undesirable characteristics. Only 14% of respondents believed that racial
discrimination was a reason for the lack of race relations (Sugrue, 2005, p. 14). The negative
attitudes of white Detroiters regarding African-Americans were found predominantly in
working-class and poor white classes; 85% reported negative perceptions while 56% middleclass whites and 42% upper-class whites reported holding negative perceptions about AfricanAmericans (Sugrue, 2005, p. 216).
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When Mayor Cobo was elected in 1950 he gave the 192 white-founded neighborhood
associations prominent roles on the city commission which took part in urban development, race
relations, and housing. This gave those neighborhood associations more power in the fight for
space and housing. The battle for housing left a physical separation between whites and AfricanAmericans in Detroit. This separation only perpetuated the housing inequality and access to jobs
as well as reinforced the ideology whites held regarding African-Americans. The term “ghetto”
became less of a physical construct as much as it became an ideological construct and racially
defined. Even as African-Americans moved into predominantly white neighborhoods, white
Detroiters would flee and then stake their claim in another area where the battle for housing
segregation would rage on. The battle that flowed in the political arena began to spill out on the
streets (Sugrue, 2005, p. 229).
White violence against African-Americans over housing was common between World
War II and the 1960s. Sugrue states that there were over 200 incidents of harassment, picketing,
effigy burnings, etc. against black families who dared to move into urban white neighborhoods.
The attacks peaked between 1954 -1957 while the economy was restructuring; these grassroots
neighborhood associations were the largest of their kind. The protective associations involved
thousands of white Detroiters and impacted hundreds of black Detroiters directly who tried to
expand into urban white areas. The violent resistance that blacks endured deepened the racial
divide but was unsuccessful in keeping blacks out altogether. The violence was also downplayed
by city officials and whites outside of the city were unaware of the reality of the backlash
African-Americans faced. The racial violence in the city hardened the definitions of white and
black identities and created a geography of black and white through invisible boundaries and
territories in the city. This violence also further alienated blacks and deepened their distrust in

20

whites and white institutions. The neighborhood violence where blacks resided left them
deprived of capital and politically marginalized; Sugrue stated that it was only a matter of time
before retaliation was taken (Sugrue, 2005, p. 258).
Crime and Policing in Detroit
Black and white Detroiters held different views on housing, education, employment and
law enforcement with law enforcement creating a more profound divide in the city of Detroit.
Nationally, the city of Detroit was said to have a better police force than most cities as well as an
education reform record that was the gold standard (Fine, 1986). The image that the country held
about Detroit however was inflated; the city had very real issues concerning employment,
poverty, education, housing and police-community relations. The Detroit Police Department
(DPD) was charged with restoring law and order in the city yet how they treated citizens differed
by race. Many black Detroiters felt that the DPD was racially biased and as the 1950s
progressed, more black residents began to feel this way; 21% of African-American residents felt
as though the DPD was one of the three most pressing issues that needed attention. The National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) conducted an analysis of the
complaints regarding police brutality by the DPD made to the Detroit Branch of the NAACP in
1957. Between January 1, 1956 to July 30, 1957, the local branch received 103 complaints, the
most frequent type being “physical assault followed by racial epithets” (Thompson, 1999, p.
127).
With the growing insistence for equality, the residents of Detroit, both black and white,
called for “law and order,” which led to the campaign that became known nationally as the “war
on crime.” The white community essentially equated the unrest associated with the pursuit of
civil rights with criminality. Thompson (2013) argues that the “war on crime” did not begin with
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Richard Nixon in 1968 but in 1965 with President Lyndon Johnson and the passing of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Act (LEAA) and creation of the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance
(OLEA). The war on crime was announced by Johnson solidified with the LEAA that he
presented to Congress on March 8, 1965. The OLEA and the LEAA gave law enforcement
officers more funding all the while changing policies that led to mass incarceration. The OLEA
provided funding to states throughout the nation to increase the number of police officers,
purchase military grade equipment and train correctional officers. In order to receive the funding
from the OLEA, cities had to demonstrate need by showing that there was a crime increase.
Thompson (2013) claimed that cities such as Detroit manipulated the data to showcase a crime
increase in an effort to garner more federal dollars from the OLEA. This claim was corroborated
by Mayor Jerome Cavanaugh who publicly stated that “new methods of counting crime had
played an important role in distorting the size of the increase” (Thompson, 2013, p. 46). This war
was one that built the overwhelming criminal justice system we see today and consisted of more
aggressive criminalization of urban areas that targeted people of color residing in those areas.
Public opinion and media opinion at the time held that the increase in arrest and
incarceration rates were in response to rising crime rates but that was not the case. What has
already been found nationwide regarding the true crime rates is similar for Detroit; the crime
rates had not risen at that point and actually were at a four-year low at the time of the
announcement of the war on crime going from 104,983 to 94,266 from 1961 to 1965 (Thompson,
2013).
The fear of crime that pervaded the community led to an increase in pressure on the DPD
to increase policing in predominantly black neighborhoods and for harsh crackdowns on the
streets. There was a dramatic jump in crime between 1965 and 1970 from 94,266 to 192,866 but
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the figures have to be viewed in the context of the growing baby-boomers population then
entering the peak crime-prone ages of the late teens and early 20s. Additionally, the DPD’s
methodology for crime reporting changed according to then police commissioner Ray Girardin;
crime actually increased by only six percent. Detroit garnered the name “the murder capital of
the world” by 1970 yet the homicide prosecutions had decreased in the 1960s by 32.2%.
Rising racial tensions and the scramble for housing in urban white neighborhoods all
came to a head on July 23, 1967 when an early morning raid of a “blind pig” exploded into a riot
that lasted for five days and could only be contained by a combination of 17,000 law
enforcement officers, members of the National Guard and federal troops. In its wake, 43 were
dead (30 at the hands of law enforcement) and 7,231 arrested. The damage that resulted from the
riots was astounding; $36 million in insured property which does not take into account the
uninsured properties that were damaged (Sugrue, 2005, p. 259). Estimates of the damage have
reported $200 million worth of damage to the city as a whole (Bledsoe, Combs, Sigelman, &
Welch, 1996).
After the riot, the number of complaints received in regard to the DPD drastically
increased and the community’s opposition grew; there were 477 complaints in 1971 versus 105
in 1965. The post-riot city saw the creation of militant groups that set out to combat the racial
discrimination witnessed in the city’s schools, housing, courtrooms, and workplaces. The postriot city also saw more backlash from the white community in their battle to control the city
politically. Roman Gibbs was elected Mayor of Detroit in 1969 to the delight of white Detroiters.
With a pro-law enforcement mayor in office who had previously served as the Wayne County
Sheriff and racial tensions still running high from the issues of the last 30 years, new black
grassroots groups popped up to challenge the political and social inequities of the city. Black
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Detroiters became even more vocal than before much to the dislike of white Detroiters
(Thompson, 1999).
The persistent vocal outrage with the DPD fell on deaf ears as the police showed no
interest in reform; the police in the city got more aggressive in fact with the creation of a special
undercover decoy unit. With the blessing of Mayor Gibbs, the DPD formed Stop the Robberies,
Enjoy Safe Streets (STRESS) in January 1971 which was touted to be a tougher unit within the
DPD that would target crime in the poor neighborhoods. According to Thompson (1999),
“STRESS officers killed an alarming number of city blacks taken into their custody” (p. 186). In
1972, the decoy unit STRESS had a controversial incident which led to it being shut down.
While searching for a suspect accused of shooting a police officer, the DPD officers attacked
innocent black community members; one person was killed, others were even beaten (Bledsoe et
al., 1996).
The black community at this time changed their tactics and instead of trying to prevent
civil unrest, they began to draw from the deep-seated anger and frustration and rejected the
political solutions brought to the city. Radical activism grew in the city and industrial plant
organizations; grassroots organizations such as Parents and Students for Community Control, the
black Student United Front, the local Panthers, and the Revolutionary Union Movements began
to flourish in the auto plants. The spread of the grassroots organizations was met with even more
resistance from white Detroiters who were even more determined to keep their political control
over the city. The white community began to distance itself even more from liberalism after 1970
especially after controversial legal battles resulted in acquittals in cases where black residents
were accused of killing white residents. Some of the victims were policemen or plant foremen so
the law enforcement community, along with white Detroiters, was enraged. It was during these
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controversial trials that black radicals found a new platform for which to air their issues against
the white authority of the city; the fight for equality had moved from the streets to the courtroom.
Off the streets, Detroit residents were facing police scrutiny as well. The city schools
began to see an intense wave of policing which was not prevalent in the country until after the
mid-1960s. Detroit schools themselves did not see the presence of police until 1969 after black
power protests at Northern High School and integration attempts at schools like Osborn
(Thompson, 2013). The presence of the police in schools grew with funding from the Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. According to Thompson (2013) the number of juveniles
being placed in correctional facilities rose and the retention rate in schools fell dramatically; the
school to prison pipeline was underway.
The election of Mayor Coleman Young in 1973 was a result of the black community’s
gaining electoral power in the city. Young was a black liberal Democrat who had organized for
the UAW, was elected to the Michigan Senate in 1963 and won the position of vice chairman of
the Democratic National Committee as the first African American to serve on the committee
(Biography.com Editors). As the first African-American mayor of Detroit, Coleman Young
served for the next two decades. He had experienced the Jim Crow South, was a vocal activist in
the city and politically active during his time as a Tuskegee Airmen; Young previously lived in
the ghettos of Detroit which seemed to make him a key person to move Detroit forward after the
devastating riots and subsequent issues the city faced (Young, 1997).
White flight had already been underway as many left when the jobs left the city center.
White Detroiters relocated to suburban areas in an effort to get away from African-Americans
who resided in the city. The exodus of whites from the city was propelled more once Mayor
Young was elected; between 1970 and 1980, 310,000 Caucasian-Americans left the city of
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Detroit and moved to the suburbs. The African-American population rose from 43.7% to 67.1%.
Two years later in 1982, the city lost an additional 63,677 residents, the majority of whom were
Caucasian. With the exodus of the Caucasian population, the city lost a vital part of its economic
base as the Caucasian Detroiters took the majority of services and activities with them. The
resulting post-white flight was a city where over 20% of the population lived below the poverty
line (Thompson, 1999). Poverty flourished in the city; high poverty census tracts increased
between 1970 and 1980 while the population living in those areas essentially doubled. In 1970,
there were 22 high poverty census tracts in Detroit with 10.9% of the Detroit poor residing in the
areas. A decade later, there were 44 high poverty census tracts in the city with 19.6% of the
city’s poor residing in the areas.
Once in office, Mayor Young vowed to deal with the issue of policing in the city of
Detroit. He is quoted as saying that his priority as mayor would be to “take control of the city’s
police department because of the oppressive tactics it used towards blacks” (Young, 1997, p. 33).
When Young ran for mayor, the DPD was 85% white in a city where half of the 1.2 million
residents (at the time) were black. Additionally, he vowed to eliminate the STRESS unit
(McGraw, 1998). During his tenure he integrated the Detroit police force and fire departments in
efforts to end the disparities and discrimination African-Americans had endured for years.
Young was elected mayor during a trying time when the massive layoffs were taking
place in the auto industry due in part to the 1973 OPEC oil squeeze; white flight was ongoing,
and crime was reportedly at a record high (McGraw, 1998). He attempted to uplift the AfricanAmerican community out of extreme poverty and even the playing field of opportunity. He
created a “sheltered market” which opened Detroit’s Purchasing Department to minority
business owners which was later ruled to be unconstitutional. The sheltered market program
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ensured that 30% of the city’s contracts go to minorities which increased the percentage of
awarded contracts that went to minority groups from 13% to 30% (Stokes, 1988).
The Detroit Planning Commission released a report that revealed the reality of the
unemployment issue in Detroit for African-Americans. One neighborhood employment center
reported that between January 1 and May 31, 1970, there were 1,173 applicants of which 1,139
were African-American; this leaves only 33 white applicants; overall 1,132 applicants fell below
the poverty line. When the city’s unemployment rate was at a fifteen-year low at 3.8% in 1978,
black Detroiters in same neighborhoods experienced an unemployment rate of 15.8%. AfricanAmericans in the 18-24 age category experienced an unemployment rate that was even higher, a
whopping 38%. With this extraordinary amount of unemployment plaguing black Detroiters, one
can easily understand how they were forced to turn to welfare. In that time however, the white
community took the increased use of welfare as a sign that members of the black community
were lazy, without recognizing how the racial biases were causing the conditions that led to
increased use of welfare. Both white and black Detroiters were receiving welfare as is the case
today and the aid was not sufficient enough to live on alone. According to the Detroit Charter
Revision Commission (DCRC) report in 1971, people who received welfare were only given $44
a month which was supposed to cover “food, clothing, school expenses, entertainment, bus fare,
personal care, everything” (Thompson, 1999, p. 175).
Throughout his tenure as Mayor, Coleman Young faced opposition from suburban
communities, other state officials and the media but found allies in President Jimmy Carter and
former Governor William Milliken; their support led to increased funding for the city of Detroit.
While in office, Detroit saw the building of the Joe Louis Arena, expansion of Cobo Hall, the
completion of the People Mover Station Transit, and the expansion of the Detroit City Airport.
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Additionally, Young’s twenty years in office saw the housing developments and low-income
housing built in Harbortown, Victoria Park, and Grayhaven. Young saw the plight of the
community and how the lack of job opportunities led to crime in the city. “People who are
hungry and unemployed commit crimes; people who have jobs and pride do not” (McGraw,
1998).
Incarceration in Detroit and It’s Effect
The state budget throughout the years reflect the changes to the carceral state and its
impact on Detroit. According to Thompson (2013), after 1971 the spending for prisons in the
state grew from 2% to 23%. The carceral state meant job loss in inner cities yet private
companies hit a payload with building prisons. The largest private company, the GEO Group,
was exempt from paying federal and state corporate taxes as it “derives at least 95% of its gross
income from real estate sources” (Thompson, 2013, p. 56). Taken together, the expansion of
prison building and moving employment opportunities as well as purchasing dollars into prisons
shows how the carceral state played a significant role in the loss of jobs in the city of Detroit
(Thompson, 2013). The late 1970s saw federal and state legislation moving towards means of
generating more profits from prisons by removing laws that regulated inmate labor in the nation.
Federally, a series of laws were passed in 1979 that weakened the restrictions placed on sale of
prison-made goods and use of prison labor (Thompson, 2013).
Between 1985 and 1992, the state of Michigan built 23 prisons and six years later there
were 41 prisons and 15 prison camps. With the growth of the carceral state, it became more
profitable for companies to pull jobs from inner cities. The incentive of building prisons to house
the masses being incarcerated took precedent over building factories, which shifted federal and
state dollars from cities like Detroit to rural areas in the state (Thompson, 2013). The onset of the
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War on Drugs in the 1980s meant that inner cities like Detroit were going to be the most
criminalized with regard to selling and use of drugs. Drug laws across the country were
becoming more punitive and Michigan followed suit with its now reformed “650-Lifer Law” —
the most Draconian drug law in the nation— which called for anyone caught with over 650
grams of heroin or cocaine to be sentenced to an automatic life-without-parole sentence. Harsh
mandatory minimums were established for lesser amounts of drugs as well. Disproportionately,
these individuals were likely to be a Detroit resident (Thompson, 2013). The “650-Lifer Law”
was enacted in 1978 and signed into law by former Governor William G. Milliken were
overwhelmingly punitive in nature; the controversial act was finally eliminated in 2003
(Affholter & Wicksall, 2002). These punitive laws left a deep impact on the city of Detroit; in
1980 there had been 3,746 drug arrests but in 1988 there were 9,618. According to Thompson
(2013), 68% of men and over 81% of women arrested in 1988 were drug users. During that year,
the Narcotics Division of the DPD required an operating budget of 11.7 million which was an
83% increase of what was needed four years earlier. In addition to the “650-lifer law,” the state
of Michigan’s mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines led to the second highest number of
adults and children serving life without parole sentences by 2011. In comparison to other states,
Michigan correctional facilities have the longest length of stay in the nation due to such
sentencing guidelines (Thompson, 2013).
A direct indicator of the impact of mass incarceration can be seen from the increase of
single-parent families with children in the city. The percentage of single-parent families with
children in the city increased from 23% in 1970 to 61% in 1990. There was a massive explosion
of the number of people who lived in high-poverty census tracts in the city; the numbers
increased to 120,000 in 1980 to 419,000 in 1990. Detroit began to see some signs of progress in
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the 1990s as with the poverty rate, murder rate, and the population living in high poverty areas
declined. As the decade progressed, the poverty rate fell from 32.6% to 26.1% and the murder
rate fell from 57 to 41 per 100,000 residents (McDonald, 2014). Locally, the city saw drops in
poverty, murder, and population as upwardly mobile African-American began to leave the city as
whites did; but nationally, the criminal justice system moved towards more punitive policies in
addressing crime and this national trend impacted Detroit.
It was during the 1990s that the incarceration rate increased more than in any previous
decade. The state of Washington passed the nation’s first “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law in
1993 and the following year the federal government enacted the law. To paint a clear picture of
the massive impact of incarceration: there were approximately as many people incarcerated
during the 1990s as there were in the nation’s penal history up to the 1990s. While the politicians
during the 1990s claimed that the Three Strikes mandate would take career criminals off the
street thereby causing crime to decline and deter potential criminals, those claims were
unfounded based on a consensus of national research findings. Nationally, crime had actually
been on the decline from 1990 to 1998 but media coverage of crime in the nation had increased
by 473% during those years. In 1994, 70% of the public thought that crime was increasing while
only 4% thought that crime was decreasing. Five years later, the public began to catch on to the
reality as 38% of respondents thought that crime was on the rise while 26% thought that crime
was on the decline. As the 1990s ended the percentage of Americans favoring mandatory
sentencing such as the Three Strikes Law declined from 55% to 38% by the year 2001 (Schiraldi,
Colburn, & Lotke, 2004).
The phenomenon of mass incarceration had a profoundly negative effect on Detroit and
caused neighborhoods to collapse in devastating ways as inmates were being placed back into
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these areas. For instance, 80% of the prisoners released to Wayne County returned to the city of
Detroit and over half of those (41%) returned to areas that are characterized as “devastated zip
codes.” The East side of Detroit has seen the concentration of the incarcerated; 1 in 22 adults in
the East area of the city have been under some form of correctional control. Brewer Park on the
East side of the city has 1 in 16 adults under some form of correctional control (Thompson,
2013). Once released into these devastated areas, Detroiters still needed to make a living and
rebuild their lives, but obtaining employment was difficult due to the stigma of being a former
offender.
In 1998, the Truth-in-Sentencing guideline was passed in the state which held that
prisoners had to serve 100% of their sentences without the possibility of parole (Truth in
Sentencing Information, n.d.). With this legislation, the parole rate in the state decreased. By
2009, prisoners in Michigan correctional facilities were serving approximately 17 months more
than the national average; they were serving sentences 79% longer than what was being served
for the same crimes in 1990. From 1995-2000, private companies in 36 states across the nation
were given free reign to utilize prison inmates instead of workers from free communities. Private
companies were able to place jobs in prisons and profit off of cheap labor versus placing jobs in
the cities where they would have to at least pay minimum wage and possibly provide benefits to
employees (Thompson, 2013).
Following the punitive period of the 1990s, crime dropped to historic lows but the federal
Three Strikes law has not been credited as a cause. What has been touted as reasons for the crime
decline is the aging of the baby boom generation from the crime-prone twenties and thirties,
economic growth, and stabilization of the crack trade in the country. Zimring discussed that at
best, 50% of the total crime decline can be accounted for due to three factors: incarceration,
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economic expansion, and demography. The levels of incarceration in the 1970s and 1980s
revealed little effect on crime. Zimring is generous with his estimate as scholars have allocated
up to 27% of the crime decline due to incapacitation (Zimring, 2007, p. 52). In addition, public
opinion has shifted regarding crime and punishment with more support being given to more
rehabilitative approaches over punitive approaches (Schiraldi, Colburn, & Lotke, 2004).
The 2000s were a different story for the city with regard to employment and population.
The city experienced a population loss unlike the previous losses in preceding decades at a rate
of 24.9%; the black population accounted for 76.8% of this loss as they had begun abandoning
the city like whites had before. Employment took a drastic decline from 2000 to 2010 with city
jobs declining 32.9% and jobs in metropolitan Detroit declining 21.2%. Total employment from
2000 to 2007 declined by 14.3%, then the financial crisis of 2008 hit along with the recession
that followed. By 2010, total employment in Detroit was down an additional 11.5%. The murder
rate began to increase again in the 2000s going from 41 to 43 per 100,000 residents. The poverty
rate in the city was 26.1% in 2000 and by 2010 the rate had increased to 36.2% while the median
income had fallen to $31,017 in 2009. Additionally, the percentage of single-parent families with
children increased from 63.1% to 70.8% (McDonald, 2014).
With the expansion of the criminal justice system, Department of Corrections jobs were
created. The increase of jobs in the correctional system did little for Detroit residents as the
prisons being built were mainly in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, which incentivized more
criminal justice action to incarcerate people. While the creation of jobs for the state could be
seen as a plus, the placement of prisons in more rural areas meant that the areas that needed jobs
most suffered. These suffering areas undoubtedly saw crime as a result of lack of jobs; the
placement of prisons incentived crime. Placing jobs in scarcely populated areas (unlike the urban
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areas that actually need the employment opportunities), the prison expansion has grown so much
that one out of every three State employee’s works for the correctional system. Additionally,
with the prisons being built in rural areas, the residents who live in Detroit but are incarcerated
elsewhere are credited in the Census as residents of the county where they are imprisoned
(Editorial Board, 2016). This shrinks the number of people that the city of Detroit can count for
the Census which then causes the city to lose the resources that the rural counties receive as they
house the prisons. The city of Detroit’s population in 1970 was 1,514,063 but forty years later
the population declined dramatically to 713,777 (Thompson, 2013).
The voting power of minorities in this country has been substantially weakened while
Caucasian voting power has increased as a result of such policies. Legislation was the main
culprit that disenfranchised African-American voting power. In the State of Michigan, one can
lose their right to vote if they are actually incarcerated for a misdemeanor or placed under house
arrest, on tether, or in a work-release program. Although parolees and probationers can vote, in
fact they are discouraged from doing so. Disenfranchisement laws exist in 48 out of 50 states,
with different effects (Thompson, 2013).
Formerly incarcerated individuals really felt the impact of unemployment; previous to
being incarcerated two-thirds of inmates were employed and half of those inmates were the
primary providers. Once released, the former inmates worked less and took home 40% less a
year. In Michigan, between 50% and 70% of parolees were unemployed. Unfortunately, the
welfare system is unable to fully support the wide-scale poverty that exists post-incarceration
with reforms that blocked aid to those with felony convictions or violations of parole and
probation. The growth of the prison population has hurt cities like Detroit. Michigan’s carceral
population has increased 538%; in the 1970s the state’s prison population was 7,834 and by 2011
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the total was 42,490. The number of individuals under the supervision of the Michigan
Department of Corrections (MDOC) is staggering; as of 2003, the MDOC was supervising a
total of 117,700 individuals across prisons, prison camps, tethering, half-way houses and other
agencies (Thompson, 2013).
Bledsoe et al. (1996) contend that race is the most distinctive feature of social and
political life in urban areas like Detroit. Race can truly impact where a person lives, their
perception of themselves and those around them, as well as their judgments. The racial landscape
of Detroit has changed drastically since the 1967 Detroit Riots; the city was primarily white and
now it is predominantly African-American. Back then, the city was controlled politically by
whites and now the city is governed predominantly by African-Americans. Unfortunately, the
economic and social conditions have not really changed for black Detroiters since the 1960s.
Unemployment, poverty, and single-parent families are more common for African-Americans
who remained in Detroit than for whites (Bledsoe et al., 1996).
In a study that compared racial attitudes of Detroit area residents from 1968-1969 to
attitudes in 1992, Bledsoe et al. (1996) revealed some interesting results regarding perception of
housing discrimination, job discrimination, and attitudes towards the other race (in surveying
whites and blacks).

While in 1969 more than half of whites felt as though blacks were

discriminated against heavily in housing, only 1 in 10 felt this way in the 1992 survey; there was
a substantial decline in white perceptions of housing discrimination as it relates to blacks.
African-Americans felt completely different however, with the percentage of blacks believing
that discrimination has persisted going from 69% in 1968 to 70% in 1992. When it came to job
discrimination, blacks actually felt as though their victimization had increased since the 1960s.
In 1968, 36% of blacks responded as having been victim of job discrimination based on their
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race and in 1992 46% of blacks responded affirmatively to being victimized. Once again, there
was a distinct difference in perceptions of whites and blacks. Both in 1969 and 1992, only one in
ten whites believed that African-Americans are generally discriminated against in jobs.
In assessing racial attitudes, Bledsoe, et al. (1996) found that in 1969 up to 64% of whites
feared blacks moving into their neighborhood but in 1992 61% saw no issue with sharing a
neighborhood with blacks. Blacks seem to have changed their views of whites also; in 1968
almost half or 47% of blacks felt as though whites wanted African-Americans to see better times
but in 1992 that number had fallen to 22% (Bledsoe, et al., 1996).
The city of Detroit is unique in its own right. The city was once a glamorous melting pot
to outsiders but the residents on the inside were engaged in a battle for space, recognition,
politics, and jobs for decades that left a permanent mark on the attitudes of natives and
newcomers. Scholars are careful to point out that the phenomenon of white flight alone was not
the sole cause of the disappearance of a vital Detroit in the 1970s and 1980s but was a definite
contributor to an action that added to the devastation of the city. Sugrue contends that Mayor
Coleman Young and the 1967 riot were not to blame for white flight, but that racial animosity
and economic decay had been fostering long before that period and that no one elected official
could take the blame (Sugrue, 2005, p. 270).
It is important to look at what’s happened in Detroit in order to incorporate the following
narratives from those who experienced the past few decades. Elite interviews with key citizens of
Detroit will provide a subjective narrative that will tell the story of Detroit from various
perspectives. The present study was born out of a need to explore how local actors grappled with
mass incarceration. Collectively, individuals have worked within the criminal justice system in
some capacity whether it be legislative, enforcement, social services, or judicially. It is important
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to discuss the racial attitudes in the city as we will speak to the role race played in policy
implications related to crime in Detroit and how racialized control was prevalent.
This study set out to explore mass incarceration on a local level in Detroit, Michigan.
Detroit’s history of contentious battles for space, racial violence and political controversies
warrants an exploration of how a national phenomenon impacted the residents of a large but
ravaged city. With intense revitalization efforts taking place in downtown Detroit, it’s natural to
question what has taken place and how those who were present for the last four decades
witnessed the structural, political and racial changes in the city. Further, this exploration attempts
to gain various perspectives that can narrate what the empirical data has shown about Detroit and
how mass incarceration aided the historical changes in the Motor City.
Methods
To explore the localized impact of mass incarceration, I set out to conduct between seven
and ten elite interviews with various individuals who work or worked within the criminal justice
system throughout the state and in Detroit, Michigan. Primary data gathered for the study comes
from eight in-depth interviews conducted in 2016 in Detroit and Lansing, Michigan. Secondary
data was gathered from the Uniform Crime Report for the state and city to show trends in violent
and property crime rates. City data were also obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics to
show trends in the total number of jailed inmates in Wayne County, which is the county where
Detroit resides. Comparisons of the Michigan prison population contrasted with the national
prison population are provided to show the population progression throughout the years. Finally,
population data specific to the city of Detroit was gathered from the decennial Census and
American Community Survey to show the changes in age, housing, racial composition of the
city, employment rates, and education and marriages from 1970 through 2010. As published
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studies have found, the targeted population in mass incarceration is young, black men; the data
pulled from the census only focused on males aged 16-25 in Detroit.
The study witnesses were selected using a non-probability referred sampling design
where witnesses were identified through conversations with two key informants, the thesis
advisor, Marvin Zalman, Ph.D. and Mr. David Smydra. The bulk of witnesses were
recommended by Mr. Smydra whose history in Detroit involves consulting in a variety of areas
with a focus on fund development and organizational development assistance to non-profit
organizations. Mr. Smydra served on the executive team to former Mayor Dennis Archer,
lectured at Wayne State University, and has credentials in the criminal justice field.

The

goal was to recruit individuals who may have worked for the city in law enforcement capacities
and/or served as an advocate for minority groups, clergy members, community activists,
scholars, or political officials of the city. By targeting a population special to the city and even
the state, the perspectives regarding the intricacies of post-World War II Detroit in the context of
mass incarceration could be better captured. The witnesses were not limited in age, race,
ethnicity, or occupation. Possible witnesses were contacted primarily through email and followup methods were primarily through telephone. Overall, there were sixteen suggested individuals
who were contacted regarding the study; two declined citing they had very little to contribute
regarding the subject of mass incarceration in Detroit, five failed to respond to inquiries, nine
interviews were scheduled and eight interviews were completed.
The witnesses who completed the interview worked in various areas: former wardens,
researchers, a sheriff, a former Supreme Court Justice, and non-profit executives. The interviews
were semi-structured interviews where the witnesses were asked a range of questions about their
professional experiences within the system, professional views on the effects of mass
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incarceration, personal feelings about the state of incarceration and its impact on the city of
Detroit, and their contributions to persistence or desistence of incarceration in the scope of their
previous or current positions. Following is a description of each of the completed witnesses
(n=8).
Bill Kime, a Caucasian male, is a former Deputy Director in research and planning at the
Michigan Department of Corrections where he worked mainly with Director Perry Johnson.
Kime assisted in creating a prison classification system for the state as well as conducting
population projections which accurately predicted that the prison population would increase.
Kime spent the last five years of his career finding sites for prisons, holding community
meetings, writing environmental impact statements, meeting with legislatures; all things
associated with the expansion of prisons.
Pamela Withrow, a Caucasian female, was the first female warden to preside over a male
prison in the history of Michigan prisons and was appointed by Director Perry Johnson to
oversee the Michigan Dunes Correctional facility. She was named warden of the Michigan
Reformatory and she retired in 2001 as one of the longest serving wardens after many years of
service.
Denise Quarles, an African-American female, also worked under Perry Johnson and was
the first female Regional Prison Administrator in the state of Michigan. She is originally from
Detroit, Michigan but her career took her across the state of Michigan. She was one of the few
women handpicked by Michigan Department of Corrections Director Perry Johnson and put on
the fast track. Ms. Quarles retired as Regional Prison Director in 2002.
Benny Napoleon, an African-American male, is a lifelong Detroiter who has risen
through the ranks of law enforcement and has witnessed the structural, political, and racial
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changes in the city of Detroit. He began his career as a rookie police officer after Mayor
Coleman Young was elected to office and rose to chief from 1998 to 2001 under Mayor Dennis
Archer. He later served as Assistant County Executive. He is the current Sherriff of Wayne
County.
Saul Green, an African-American male, is a lifelong Detroiter who was the state’s first
appointed African-American United States Attorney. He worked as the Chief Counsel for the
Department of Housing and Development for the state and then worked as an Assistant United
States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan. Mr. Green served as Deputy Mayor of
Detroit and then transitioned back into practice at a local law firm.
Cindy Eggleton, a Native-American female, is another lifelong Detroiter who has witness
the changing structure of the city. She co-founded Brilliant Detroit which aims to create
successful neighborhoods for Detroit kids. She has worked in various areas focusing on
communication designs with a heavy emphasis on community issues. She also currently works as
the Chief Strategy Officer at the Detroit Rescue Mission Ministries.
Marilyn Kelly, a Caucasian female, is a retired Michigan Supreme Court Justice who
practiced law throughout Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties from the mid-1970s until her
election to the Court of Appeals in 1988-1996. She then served on the Michigan Supreme Court
for 16 years before retiring in 2012.
Dennis Nordmoe, a Caucasian male, arrived in Detroit in 1967 after finishing divinity
school to serve as a pastor in a local church. He moved into a career as a substance abuse and
alcoholism counselor for 26 years and wrote various strategic plans for the city regarding
prevention. He went on to work for the Detroit Housing Commission and retired early to engage
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in neighborhood development, which is what he currently does with the Urban Neighborhood
Initiative.
Together the eight witnesses represented four females, four males, three different races:
Caucasian (n=4), African-American (n=3), and Native-American (n=1). The witnesses were
asked about their perspectives on the impacts of mass incarceration in Detroit as it relates to
policing, families, schools, politics, racial attitudes, and prisoner re-entry in the city of Detroit.
The questions were intentionally broad to encourage the respondents to freely talk and develop
their responses based on their Detroit expertise and experience. Each question was asked in the
context of post-World War II Detroit in the era of mass incarceration. Questions pertained to the
impact of reintegration of men coming home from prison and if needed, respondents were asked
to elaborate by giving some examples. Another question asked respondents to speak to the
economic impact of mass incarceration in Detroit along with examples. The respondents were
asked to speak to the impact mass incarceration had on families in Detroit. Finally, witnesses
were asked if they had any other information they wanted to discuss if they wished to go into
depth on issues that were not really addressed in the questions.
One interview resulted in the suggestion of another possible witness who agreed to take
part in the study. With the consent of each witness, interviews were audio-recorded and
transcribed; the transcription was done manually within 24 hours of each interview. The data
were collected in various settings as I allowed the witness to meet me in a location of their
choosing. Interviews took place in the back of coffee shops, law offices, the sheriff’s office, and
finally in the homes of the witness. All witness agreed to disclose their identities and consented
to their names and occupation or relevant occupational history being published.
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The number of elite interviews was limited to seven to ten for sake of the thesis project.
In qualitative research, sampling is typically continued until the sample reaches a level of
saturation where no new relevant data is provided by additional respondents (Flick, 1998; Morse,
1995). Saturation allows the researcher to have better confidence in making cross-case
generalizations. However, like all non-probability sampling designs, it is impossible to estimate
how the sample differs from the population. I manually searched for patterns and themes
throughout the eight interviews. The methodology offers both strengths and weaknesses. The
witnesses were selected based on their connection to the city and criminal justice system which
ensured they offered substantive information in the interviews. As the interviews are qualitative,
the researcher recognizes that the nature of retrospective information may be diluted with
memory issues, distortion or dishonesty. The aspect of combining various perspectives however
provides a unique level of understanding to the experiences of system actors during a tumultuous
time in local and national history that has had a profound impact on a city that was once regarded
as a model city. Offenders and ex-offenders were purposely not contacted as they are a
vulnerable population and time did not permit for navigating through the approval process of the
Institutional Review Board. Further, the topic of mass incarceration from the offender and exoffender’s perspective is something I hope to explore for my doctoral dissertation.
In order to discuss mass incarceration in Detroit further, there is a need to examine crime
data, incarceration data, and population data locally. The data gathered will help shape the
narratives provided by the witnesses and will provide insight to the what took place from the
1970s until 2010.
Results and Discussion
Figure 2: Violent and Property Crime in Michigan
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The above figure from the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) for the State of Michigan shows
the crime statistics from law enforcement agencies as annual rates of violent crime (murder,
aggravated assault, rape, and robbery) and property crime (burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle
theft) aggregated and published from 1975 to 2012. From the data we can see that the rates of
violent crime were consistently lower than that of property crime. In 1975, the rate of violent
crime in the state was 685.7 per 100,000 residents. Violent crimes fluctuated and then were
generally on the rise until 1991 when they hit a high rate of 803.1 per 100,000. Michigan saw a
drop in violent crime throughout the 1990s; rates fell from 803.1 per 100,000 to 574.9 per
100,000 in 1999. Violent crime in the state was at a reported low of 454.5 per 100,000 in 2012
(Uniform Crime Report, n.d.). Property crime in Michigan followed a trend similar to violent
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crime in the state. In 1975, property crime is shown to be 6,114.6 per 100,000 in 1975 which
fluctuated until the 1990s where the crime drop occurs. Beginning in 1991, property crime rates
in the state declined from 5335 per 100,000 to 3750 per 100,000 in 1999. Michigan’s property
crime rate in 2012 is reported to be 2350.5 per 100,000 (Uniform Crime Report, n.d.). The data
falls in line with what scholars have discussed as the crime drop when crime in the 1990s fell to
historic lows. While property crime increased at the end of the 1970s, from the 1980s there was a
steady decline of property crime incidence in Michigan.
Figure 3: Violent and Property Crime in Detroit
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The UCR crime data for Detroit in Figure 3 shows the annual violent crime rate and
property crime rates from 1985 to 2012 excluding 1993 due to reporting changes. In 1985,
violent crime was on a steady but not dramatic rise moving from 2375.2 per 100,000 to 2727.3
per 100,000 in 1991; from there we see a crime decline through 1997 where violent crime rates
in the city were reported at 2151.2 per 100,000. As of 2012, violent crime rates in Detroit were
2122.9 per 100,000 (Uniform Crime Report, n.d.). Property crime fluctuated in the city with a
steady decline from 1985 at a rate of 11,374.7 per 100,000 to 8,696.2 per 100,000 in 1992.
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Detroit’s property crimes increased again into the late 1990s; the steady decline of property
crime began in 1996 when crime was at a high for the decade at 9726.7 per 100,000. As of 2012
the property crime rate in the city was 5792.1 per 100,000 (Uniform Crime Report, n.d.). The
end of the 1990s saw decreases of property crimes until 2006 and 2010 when there were
increases. The crime trends fall in line with previous research and it is acknowledged that the
exclusions of other crimes, such as misdemeanor and drug crimes that fall outside of violent and
property offenses are a weakness of the data.
Figure 4: Total Jail Inmates Incarcerated in Wayne County
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When we look at the total number of inmates jailed, the most consistent data comes from
the Bureau of Justice Statistics regarding the Wayne County Jail with the earliest year being
1987. As shown in Figure 4, the late 1980s saw well over 1,500 people incarcerated in Wayne
County jails which then increased rolling into the 1990s with approximately 2,500 people being
incarcerated in 1994. The total number of inmates further increased into the 2000s with almost
3,000 being jailed in 2006; then the data shows a slight decline the following year.
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Figure 5: National and State of Michigan Prison Census Data
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When Prison Census data is examined we see in Figure 5 that from 1978 until 2009 there
was a progressive increase in the number of individuals incarcerated in the United States. In
1978 the prison population was 307,276 and by 1994 we see that the total increased to over one
million incarcerated. The prison population peaked in 2009 with 1,615,487 individuals being
incarcerated in the nation and this was followed by declining totals through 2014. For the State
of Michigan, the pattern is essentially the same concerning the prison population. In 1978 the
state prison population was 14,944 and increased each year until 2002 when the state prison
population reached 50,591. The early 2000s saw a decline in the number of state prisoners and
the late 2000s saw an increase again with the total hitting a high of 51,577 prisoners residing in
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state facilities. From 2007 through 2014, however, there has been a steady decline of the prison
population.
Population data gathered from the decennial Census and ACS sample show the struggle
Detroit has faced in housing, racial composition, employment, education, and marriage. The rate
of home non-ownership (i.e. renters) only increased over the decades going from 22.5% in 1970
to 46.8% in 2010. As the city deteriorated between 1970 and 2010, the rate of residents who
were non-homeowners climbed. The racial composition of the city has drastically changed with
the rates of African-Americans residing in the city going from 17.85% in 1970 to 83.90% in
2010. From 1970 to 1980, the rates of blacks living in the city jumped drastically from 17.85% to
63.04%. While the population in Detroit decreased, the rate of males in the population drastically
deceased as time progressed. Males age 16-25 were 56% of the population in 1970 and they
drastically declined to 16.20% of the population after the 1980 Census. This drastic decrease
would fall in line with the introduction of the War on Drugs and harsh sentencing that took place.
The rate of males age 16-25 continually decreased and as of 2010, the rate was 9.5% of the
population. Marriage has seen a decline amongst Detroit residents; the rate of divorce was a low
2.86% in 1970 and jumped to 7.29% in 1980; by 2010 the rate of divorce was approximately ten
percent (9.92%). This finding falls in line with the literature review of the decrease in marriages.
Further, Detroit has seen a steady decline of residents who have attained a high school diploma.
The rates of educational attainment were over 50% in 1970 (54.4%) and have fallen to 32.7% as
of the 2010 Census. The city’s unemployment rates show some fluctuations with a jump from
3.2% in 1970 to 10.7% in 1990, followed by a decline in the early 2000s to 8%; as of the 2010
Census, the unemployment rate had risen again to 17%, its highest in the years of data collection
(Ruggles, Genadek, Goeken, Grover, & Sobek, 2015). Prior to 1990 there was a lack of

46

consistent data as far as availability and measurements so data points vary depending on the
source. For instance, the Wayne County jail inmate data’s earliest collection year was 1987 while
the state and national prison census information is available for the late 1970s. The interviews
revealed several emerging themes; the connections to the city, the political side aspect of mass
incarceration, leading forces, the economics, returning citizens and the feeling of overreaction of
the system.
Connection to Detroit
Half of the respondents (n=4) were either lifelong Detroiters or had lived and worked in
Detroit for at least fifty years. These respondents were witnesses to the structural, political,
racial, and economical changes the city experienced in the last half century. Sheriff Napoleon
talks about growing up in Detroit during tumultuous times:
First I think that it’s an important to note that I’m a lifelong Detroiter. I’ve been here
since 1955 when I was born. I was almost 12 years old when the riots in 1967 occurred,
so I remember them vividly. I lived in the 10th precinct where the riots started. I was right
at the epicenter of the riot when it started. I had many encounters with the Detroit police
department as a young man growing up in that environment.
Growing up in Detroit as a Native American, Cindy Eggleton hails from a family that
experienced the poverty of Detroit.
I’m a lifelong Detroiter, a Native American, and first generation college graduate. My
mother was in a foster home because of poverty; I can play a variety of roles. I have
worked in just about every type of areas: social issues, care, and concern.
Dr. Dennis Nordmoe moved to Detroit in 1967 to serve as a youth pastor and subsequently began
to work with vulnerable populations in the city.
I arrived on July 16, 1967, just one week before the riots. I lived in an area that was
transitioning to becoming predominantly African-American; it was a mixed church and I
lived nearby. I worked three years full-time, one as a youth pastor in development work,
[at] the local child care center. I got a job with the city of Detroit as an alcoholism
counselor and then later as a program developer in substance abuse. I did that for the next
26 years; during that time I started prevention of substance abuse. I wrote various
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strategic plans for the city and prevention. I went from there to work with the Detroit
housing commission in the employment and training department in the city. I retired early
to take up a high risk, low income opportunity to do neighborhood development. I really
felt that we needed to develop healthy neighborhoods to surround the developing child
with rich, stabilizing, positive influences.
Saul Green has served his community for decades in a variety roles from the United States
Attorney to Deputy Mayor.
I’m a lifelong Detroiter and in 1994 I was appointed as the United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of Michigan. When Kwame Kilpatrick stepped down as mayor, under the
charter the president of the city council takes over, Ken Cockrel asked me to serve as
Deputy Mayor for six months. When he was beat in the election, I was asked to stay on
and I did that until 2011.
Politics of Mass Incarceration
Politically, what took place nationally, also took place at home and some in the Detroit
law enforcement field were in support of the policies. Sheriff Napoleon admits his support which
he rallied for on Capitol Hill although he admits to changing his position:
I was in favor of the crime bill at the time; I was police chief, I went to Capitol Hill…
One of the things that I argued vehemently for; crime preventative dollars and education
dollars. I agreed that we needed to put bad people in jail but let’s do something to keep
them out of jail. I can tell you unequivocally as a person that was on the hill talking to
legislators at the time, they all had the same response. They wanted that get tough on
crime stuff; they didn’t want to spend money on fluff stuff or anything that was perceived
as being soft on crime. We tried, we just couldn’t sell it!
System actors fell on the side of a bipartisan or conservative blame for the policies being
promoted and driven. Sheriff Napoleon pointed towards the Clinton Administration which is
responsible for passing some of the most damaging crime policies in this country:
I think it was both sides, look at the Clinton crime bill. There were some good things in
that bill that we wanted and we didn’t end up getting.
Cindy Eggleton agrees with Sheriff Napoleon that politically, the fault could not be placed with
just one party; within the political arena, the popular platform was crime and candidates were
sure to speak to the public’s fears.

48

I think in general with politics, it’s another whole issue together. I think that there was a
much more centrist, populist idea that drove the policies. There’s one thing to be
prejudice[d], have power dynamics, and have fear. It’s another thing for policy to be
informed by that because that exists and it’s based on electability. So I think that in some
sense it became a way to become more centrist and use that as a platform without
thinking about the repercussions. The travesty is that I don’t think these policies of being
tough on crime did nothing for crime.
Some witnesses believed that the Republican party had a heavy foothold in mass incarceration
with the conservative policies coming down and parole boards being comprised of more
conservative members. Bill Kime mentions local conservative politicians:
I would say that the policies were more bipartisan but the heavier contribution was more
on the Republican side. But, Governor Blanchard, a Democratic, got rid of the
corrections committee. William Milliken was a Republican and one of the most
progressive thinkers in the corrections area that we have had in this state. Blanchard
catered to the fear.
Dr. Nordmoe, while in agreement that the policies were driven by both political parties, viewed
the bipartisanship a little differently than the other respondents.
I would say bipartisan because we have a crime problem and the simplistic way of
addressing the problem is to say, well, we need to get this under control, it’s hurting
everyone. The homicide rate in Detroit was out of control. One year when I was
monitoring it, the number of children murdered was over one hundred. That was a time
when we really had a wake-up call to what was going on. The policies seemed common
sense because it seemed like black people were suffering the most. It just wasn’t thought
through enough. Had they recognized the role education plays in this, they would have
insisted that they go to school while in prison. I’m part of that bipartisan consensus in
that I thought we needed to clamp down. On the other hand, I recognized that it wasn’t
primary prevention so I was also was outlining that it was a pipeline to this problem. So I
saw that these kids weren’t getting addicted they were getting into the selling of the drugs
because that’s the only thing they are qualified to do. So the point of intervention needs
to be about employment and about lifestyle and values that will propel them into working
for gratification. That was my professional opinion, but on the side I remember thinking
there’s got to be some crime control. There were so many break-ins and shooting in my
neighborhood.
Like Sheriff Napoleon, Saul Green discussed the Clinton administration in his response that the
policies of mass incarceration were bipartisan.
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The Democrats were on board with what has resulted in mass incarceration. If you look at
some of the policies and positions President Clinton took on, criminal justice policies
clearly was one of the biggest contributors to mass incarceration − was our drug laws I
believe.
Forces of Legislation
Fear of crime was the prevailing force said to have driven the legislation that led to mass
incarceration. System actors recognized that there was a fear of crime in the city, state, and
nation that was a determinant of what legislation was enacted. Witnesses were attuned to the
climate in the state and city during the onset of mass incarceration, and the ensuing explosion of
incarceration that followed was what I believe was a perfect storm of forces that aided legislation
in corrections. Sheriff Napoleon states,
No question, it’s all these get tough on crime initiatives, mandatory sentencing, War on
Drugs. It’s all these things that sound like we are getting tough on crime but it didn’t
work. All it did was explode the prison population. One of the main things I talk about is
this alleged War on Drugs we’ve been fighting since the 1960s. We do the same things
here in Detroit that we’ve done from a narcotics stand point since I was a rookie. But they
don’t want to hear that, the rhetoric that the average citizen wants to hear is that I’m
cracking down on crime.
So elected officials were catering to their constituents despite their knowledge that crime was not
as rampant as the average citizen thought and the tactics being used were ineffective. The
public’s fear of crime was consistently mentioned in the interviews. Cindy Eggleton recognized
that fear coupled with other factors of marginalization of minorities to aid in passing legislation,
There’s been a real prejudice against people of color and people who didn’t have a lot. I
think fear and prejudice.…I really think that it’s fear, prejudice and power dynamics.
Bill Kime pointed towards fear of crime that stemmed from isolated incidents that were turned
into anecdotes to scare the public,
There was a fear of crime and politicians. So you get an incident, one escape and
someone being injured can reestablish fear; politicians used that. So laws passed
irrationally because you play on fear of crime, fear of blacks.
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Bill spoke to the sentencing locally and its impact,
Michigan has some of the longest sentences in the country, I’m not sure. The long
sentences are anti-productive, they don’t protect the public and they just cost a lot of
money and they destroy people.
In agreement with Bill Kime, Denise Quarles pointed to among other things, the mandatory
sentencing and drugs as forces. She discussed the legislatures pitch of cracking down on drug
kingpins when in reality they were getting low-level dealers and addicts,
I think it was political first of all. There was the push to get tough on drugs; a lot of
people got pulled into the system off of small amounts of drugs. These people were
getting big years! Most of these people were not real dangers to the community.
Legislature they sold it as “we’re going to get the king pins.” But they weren’t getting the
king pins. They didn’t get the people that were having it flown in from wherever they
were getting the nickel and dimers. We had prisons full of people who were drug addicts
who became mules to fuel their habit.
Dennis Nordmoe pointed to the drug laws, the subsequent appearance of crack cocaine, and the
Detroit riot of 1967 as the forces that increased incarceration to massive levels. He claims that
following the riots, crime was rampant and called for more enforcement.
I’m aware that a lot of this was a change in laws around drugs. The belief was that we
just have to get so strict that people would just stop selling drugs. Then crack came along
and it was viewed to be so terrible and a terrible escalation so the notion was to make the
penalties even more strict. So that strict penalties would protect more. Another thing that
was going on was a huge explosion after the riot and I saw it firsthand. A church that I
served in over by Livernois and Chicago was broken into 15 times in five years. A 75year old shoemaker was beaten to death in his shop. A nun in the Catholic church two
blocks from us was murdered. A college girl, a Wayne State Student who lived near the
church was killed in a fire bombing of her room. A child was killed and a young man was
throwing a brick at the child’s mother and I knew the young man who I did it. Then
around my house, in 1968 we had a couple of Plymouths, the Plymouths were stolen a
few times. The people next door to us were always fighting and shoving and saying awful
things to each other. Two weeks after they moved out, one killed the other on the front
lawn. What upset me was that people were acting like there was no problem and it really
was the same everywhere and that the newspapers were just making it seem as if things
were bad.
Saul Green credited fear and the targeting of African-Americans but noted that mass
incarceration is one of the worst components of the system.
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I think that fear drove the legislation. I think there has always, and always meaning
throughout the history of this country African-Americans have always been associated
with crime and violence and illegitimacy. When I say illegitimacy I mean that in a very
broad sense. So through our history there’s been an effort to control and to use black
people as a justification by saying they’re dangerous, oversexed and corrupt. It’s just that
there came a time when that perspective took a significant turn for the worst in terms of
using the criminal justice system. The mass incarceration is the worst component of the
use of the criminal justice system in terms of its impact on African-Americans. It’s all
sorts of stages up to incarceration that are also a part of this process that have had a
devastating impact on African-Americans for the last 30 or 40 years. Maybe even longer.
It drove law enforcement tactics that I think ended up having a devastating impact on our
communities.
Justice Kelly spoke to the public fear and the suggestion of racism within the system.
It certainly was a period, and I don’t think it’s true now, when most members of the
public listed fear of crime as one of their top concerns. For example, when I was running
in 1992 and 1994, I know that surveys done by media people tended to show that to be
true. So certainly we know that people being elected in the state knew that and were
reacting to it. So it’s reasonable to assume that many that were elected were concerned
that the people who put them in office would want to know what they had done to curb
crime or be tough on crime. I just say that it was probably part of it. And there’s been
racism, everyone knows it. I think that some people who have been in public office have
shared that racism and it’s motivated some of their decisions.
Economics of Incarceration in Detroit
Economically, incarceration is regarded as a business. Sheriff Napoleon discusses how
economical mass incarceration. He indicates mass incarceration is profitable and suggests other
social arenas get far less focus because they cannot generate profit the same way.
There’s a whole economic benefit to the prison industrial complex. You know how many
people are getting money off of the incarceration business. Someone’s making money off
of providing food for all of these people, somebody’s building these prisons, it’s
employment for a lot of people, so it’s a whole economic engine that’s self-perpetuating.
So I believe there’s no resolve or real will to encourage the same kind of commitment to
education.
Moving away from the profit of prison, Cindy Eggleton couples incarceration, foreclosures, and
education as a triangulation of the crippling economic downside to mass incarceration:
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It’s devastating. Statistics speak for themselves. It’s really a tale of two cities. When you
look at the statistics of people who have been incarcerated, cannot get jobs, living at the
poverty level - it’s massive. It’s crippled the city. You take that, foreclosures, and this
god awful education system that makes it hard to get out of are the issues.
Dr. Nordmoe focused on the expenditures that are used to incarcerate and contrasted those to
what we could do with the funds repurposed for education.
It’s costing us something like $50,000 as a state to do this per person. If we’re trying to
fund our public education and be cheap at $7,500 per person, we should be spending that
money on youth employment programs that are also linked to education. It’s the wrong
strategy, we need to recognize how much we’re spending, and how much crime is costing
and put that into education in our schools. Spend the same amount of money and get
better results. By recognizing not only that we have crime, we need to punish the
criminals; we should look at how much we are going to spend on the punishment part and
how much are we going to spend on the human development part.
Saul Green spoke to the burden communities face after losing a citizen then having that citizen
be replaced with no skill, education, and fewer freedoms than other community members as
economic repercussions of the mass incarceration.
I think that mass incarceration has had an absolutely devastating impact on our
communities in a myriad of ways but the economic development is one. Yes, I believe
that when you remove people from a concentrated predictable area it removes a
significant economical part of that community. People who go to prison leave. Normally
they are going to return to the communities where they were extracted from. So first you
have the removal and you have the impact on families and then you have people
returning to that community disabled because they’re told all of the things they can’t do
from voting, the stigma, etc. So then they become a weight and they will because of
issues related to employment often return to crime. I think that mass incarceration has
had a tremendous impact on Detroit and other urban cities, the Flints, the Pontiacs.
Returning Citizens to Detroit
The issue of reintegration that perils every large city is no different in Detroit; the issue
however, may be considered worse. What plagues the city is the returning of uneducated and
untrained citizens to a city that offers nothing to the uneducated and unskilled. Wayne County
Sheriff Napoleon states,
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The easiest way to make a person employable is to give them a skill or a talent. Even if I
am not going to go to law school, medical school, get my PhD, get my master’s,
whatever; teach me how to be a plumber, an electrician, or a roofer. Which is education
of a different form; you’re still learning how to do something that will make you
employable. As opposed to learning how to do nothing and become under-employed.
These people are ill prepared to re-enter the public. There’s a mindset to being
incarcerated. They become even more unemployable because of recidivism due to lack of
opportunity. We need to understand that when people come out and they have nothing,
they are going to go back in.
Returning to the community means that there needs to be a consideration for what takes
place while offenders are incarcerated especially given how massive the corrections system is.
Pamela Withrow discussed the cognitive-based programming she implemented during her career.
In terms of the cognitive programming, that is now department wide and I am kind of
proud of that because we started about ten years before the department got on board with
it. It’s evidenced based; it’s the sort of thing that professional corrections ought to be.
You figure out what works with guys and then you deliver and those that want it and use
will go on and live happily ever after and those that don’t won’t - but at least they have a
choice.
Denise Quarles discusses the hypocrisy offenders face when they return to their community and
find that they cannot find the very things that we demand of them due to stigma.
It’s always troubled me that oftentimes people who are out on parole, the community
doesn’t want to accept them. They don’t want to give them a job, they don’t want to give
them a chance; but it’s the same community that complains about recidivism. You can’t
have it both ways. You have to pick, and what’s the most positive way to do it? It’s to
reintegrate these people back in. You also can’t complain about the programs that are
offered in prison and also complain about recidivism. Because I ran a halfway house and
I was a parole agent, I had some experience with people getting out and trying to get
reintegrated and it was hard. Most of the time the jobs they could get were low paying
jobs; they were not jobs you wouldn’t want to make a career out of. Like car wash,
cutting grass, landscaping type of thing. They certainly weren’t making a lot of money.
Saul Green, while acknowledging that the language has changed, also acknowledges that there is
much more work to be done in reintegration of citizens.
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First there has to be resources available over a long enough of period of to allow people
to acclimate to being free again an also to obtain the skills. The skills even mean basic
life skills – get up in the morning and go. They talk about the number of jobs in this
country that are actually available right now because we can’t find people who are
qualified to hold these positions. We’ve moved from a society that was very labor
intensive to one where technology is incumbent in almost everything and anything you
do. So on the most basic level we’ve prevented these large number of people from having
these skills. So between life skills and technical job skills there’s nothing going on. I’m
sorry but there’s some people doing great work but to bring that to scale to address the
magnitude of this issue – as far as I’m concerned overall we’re just playing around.
The Overreaction of the System
There was a unanimous consensus that the criminal justice system began an overreaction
in the 1970s which resulted in incarceration, prison expansion, decimated communities,
persistent minority marginalization, and the accompanying damages of systemic incarceration of
a targeted race in Detroit. Cindy Eggleton points the lack of meaningful solutions;
I think the system definitely overreacted. It’s more than overreaction though. I think the
system typecast and I think they looked for a quick silver bullet solution and that’s not
the way. I don’t think the policies put in place looked at system as a whole and ask:
“What does this really mean?” I think that was both politics and policies and a lack of
depth that went into things.
The overreaction meant that the increase in arrests would require space for offenders. Bill Kime
discusses the prison growth and how legislation aimed at containing the prison population was
discarded due to fear of crime.
The legislature didn’t want to appropriate the money to build new prisons. So we passed
the Prison Overcrowding and Emergency Powers Act. The act provided that once the
prison population exceeded the capacity and the commission certified that the population
was over the capacity, 90 days would be removed from the minimum sentence for
everyone having a minimum sentence. We would have had to add a 500 bed prison every
six weeks to keep up with the growth and we were only getting about halfway so we had
overcrowding. In 1984 one of the early parolees who got out early killed a housewife and
a policeman in East Lansing, three miles from the capital. The OEP act was trashed; we
tanked it. That’s why the population in the late 1980s took off. When that was gone, we
really had to build prisons everywhere.
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Saul Green saw the overreaction in the sense that he knew the system was not responding in an
effective way.
I didn’t believe that the issues that we faced as it related to crime, particularly violent
crime -that we could ever prosecute our way out of that. That we could never investigate,
prosecute, convict and imprison our way to a safer community. It was important for me to
make sure that everybody understood my perspective as US Attorney. So it was
important for me to say from the outset that we would vigorously prosecute those that
hurt other people but this is not the answer. So I always aspired the public health
perspective; a combination of factors that had to be used to deal with violent crime –
prevention, intervention, enforcement and reentry. I knew that we couldn’t accomplish
public safety simply by putting people in jail. I knew that it was wasteful, it was
ineffective, it was unfair when you looked at the demographics of who was incarcerated.
I knew there were high levels of recidivism so prison wasn’t accomplishing anything
except recycling. When it first hit me it was 1990 and I was a US Attorney and it was
announced via media coverage that we had hit 1 million people in the USA that were in
jail. At no point in this country had we ever incarcerated this many people. You’d have
to be asleep not to be impacted by that.
Saul is cautious about what lies ahead of such an overreaction.
That’s what you see and you feel now. Everybody’s now trying to figure out what to do
about what was intentionally created. From liberals to conservatives to libertarians all
hugging saying “We got to do something about it.” The issue for me is “What do you do”
because you don’t just open up the doors and let people out, that takes a process and then
let them out to what, to what resources, to what conditions? So I’m glad that people’s
attitudes have changed regarding this issue 30 years after the fact. I have no idea what
these well-intentioned folk have in mind.
Justice Kelly discussed the system’s reaction being understandable yet not justifiable.
Oh sure, definitely. There was a prejudicial effect on the black community and poor
people. You can say that the system reacted in ways that are understandable but that
doesn’t mean they are justifiable.
Looking Ahead
What’s made Detroit an interesting place to study is the uniqueness of its devastation.
The city endured restructuring at every level for well over half of a century. Sheriff Napoleon
discusses the unique but impactful situation Detroit faces:
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I think that the interesting thing that most people can’t wrap their head around is that this
was a city of two million people in it and now there are maybe 700,000. So it’s a
completely different community. It was the only city in America that’s lost what would
be a major top ten city population wise if all those people had left and went to one city.
Detroit is probably one of the biggest cities in America but it lost 1.3 million people, so
it’s a very interesting thing when you look at the devastation from a blight standpoint.
How do you lose more than half your population and not see an impact?
Those tied to the city, its history and future see an existing solution to the problem of
incarceration in the city, education. Placing a focus on education was a recurring theme in the
interviews. Cindy Eggleton, who has worked as a strategist and is co-founder of Brilliant Detroit
which aims to create healthy and happy neighborhoods for kids, plainly puts it,
I think that education is the way out. We do have generations and we are trying to change
those dynamics for generations and it’s not easy. For me, education is the best breaker of
mass incarceration. The schools I’ve worked with are some of the worst in the city and
really how do you not turn your back on people but actually create strategy’s to help.
Sheriff Napoleon also discussed the opportunity education provides.
Those of us who went to college and have our degrees are doing better personally than
those of us who just graduated from high school. Those of us who graduated from high
school are doing better to some degree than most of us who are not.
Special attention to early childhood education and reducing the risk of delinquent behavior early
through education was offered as a popular solution. Sheriff Napoleon states,
My take on it is to focus on early childhood education and really focusing on giving our
children an opportunity. I always say in speeches that we’d rather send them to prison
than send them to Princeton.
So if we know the value of education and we really want to tackle the problem of over
incarceration, why wouldn’t we focus our time, effort, energy, and money on getting our
children educated especially in Pre-K up until the fourth or fifth grade? We know that if
you can read, write, add, subtract, multiply, and divide by fourth grade, your chances of
graduating from high school and potentially going to college increases. But if you miss
the boat by third grade, there’s a good chance you won’t get on that boat. So we know all
of this, so why aren’t we doing something about it? Because as a community we’d rather
build prisons than to build colleges and universities up. It’s easy to sell to people to put
these bad people away then it is to say save a poor young black or brown child that has
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the opportunity to do well if given the right resources. Give them the right tools and they
can succeed. It’s clearly demonstrated. It’s an easy sell to say put them in prison.
Dr. Nordmoe believed that instead of the overreaction of incarceration, the solution should be to
fix the educational system in the city and get the parents involved in understanding why it’s
important that their children be in school and engaged.
One of the issues should have been: We have got to make our education system work.
We have to pay attention to where it’s failing and get on right way, there’s no time to
waste. The battle there was not how to get it to work but how to get control. This last
Wednesday, the Department of Education released a report indicating that Detroit has the
worst attendance rate in the country. 58% of Detroit kids are chronically absent.
Everybody knows finally that our economy is becoming knowledge base; jobs in IT,
Finance, Engineering. Detroit schools are not producing that kind of kid, of the kids that
are even staying in school. So they in turn feel like they’re not getting theirs and they
engage in high risk activity like drug selling. We need to help the parents understand that
they have to be in school every day. You cannot learn algebra going every other day.
How do you explain that to parents who don’t know what algebra is, they don’t
understand why it’s important? They still may want their kids to succeed.
Discussion
Historically, Detroit has been plagued with issues that are deeply rooted in race and can
be traced back to a time of pivotal changes that forced the city and its residents to confront their
political, racial, economic, and social differences. As the literature reveals, Detroit began to
racially divide in the early twentieth century with the arrival of the first African-American
immigrants. The city’s uniqueness is found in its devastating loss of population and its attempts
to recover from such a blow. The criminal justice system’s presence in the city has been
controversial at times and hotly debated, yet the need for public safety makes it a vital part of the
city. This study took a look at the history of mass incarceration in the United States, the history
of Detroit, and mass incarceration in Detroit historically to frame the subsequent elite interviews
with eight system actors. The witnesses either were lifelong Detroiters who worked within the
criminal justice system or alongside it; others were system actors who had knowledge and
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expertise of incarceration and its impact. Common themes found throughout the interviews were
the belief in bipartisan responsibility for mass incarceration, the contributing factors that drove
legislation, the economic implications, and reintegration of mass incarceration. Additional
themes found throughout the transcripts of interviews were the consensus of a systemic
overreaction to crime and solutions for ending mass incarceration’s impact in Detroit.
As evidenced by the interviews, respondents believed that the political climate during the
origins of mass incarceration were mostly rooted in politicians on both sides of the aisle running
on get tough on crime policies, proposing harsher legislation than their predecessors, and
opponents

with more influence falling on the conservative side. Fear of crime was

overwhelmingly mentioned in interviews when discussing the forces that drove legislation.
Respondents also pointed to other factors like existing racial biases, mandatory sentencing, and
bad policies in addition to mandatory sentencing. How Detroit’s racial makeup drastically
changed with the Second Great Migration is testament to the racial biases. The history of racial
struggles spilling over into the streets seems to be present today and I felt it was noteworthy that
the impact of race arising in interviews was disclosed. The economic implications of mass
incarceration in the city of Detroit were frequently referred to in terms of the burdens and
deficits. Respondents spoke to the devastation of the removal of citizens and the subsequent
return of citizens who were returned unskilled and uneducated. Reentry issues were addressed
with witnesses calling upon the system to better prepare those returning to the community while
incarcerated for employment and sustainability. The cognitive programming that Pamela
Withrow started in her tenure as warden at the Michigan Reformatory stands out as evidencedbased practice that can lead to improvement in post-release for offenders. Outside of cognitive
programming, witnesses spoke to the failure of reintegration success and the need for
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improvement. All witnesses felt as though there was a systemic overreaction that led to large
scale incarceration which left Detroit more ravaged than before.
The population data depicts the decline of education in the city and that was expanded
upon in the interviews with respondents looking ahead to education as a key to turning around
the situation in Detroit. Respondents saw education as a way out of the hole left by mass
incarceration and felt particular focus should be placed on early childhood education. With more
emphasis on childhood education, what I found was that those who have spent their life in
Detroit believe that preventive efforts such as education can deter residents from crime. The
Detroit Public School system must rise to meet this challenge given the problems it has recently
faced, but there is hope for the future (Mull, 2016).
The use of in-depth interviews requires the consideration of dishonesty, distortion, and
memory in discussing retrospective events and information. Biases may exist given the racial
composition of the witnesses involved in the project and may cloud their interviews. What’s
valuable about the information provided is the variety of perspectives given on localized mass
incarceration and its impact. Having first-hand accounts from those who have witnessed the
changing system and city is invaluable. In order to expand on this project, one could take the
research a step further and interview current offenders who are from Detroit, Michigan or exoffenders who are from the city and have been released back.
This research offers a system-based perspective of what’s taken place in the city of
Detroit and touches upon what should take place moving forward. If we take the census data that
shows the decline in general population in the city with the decrease in males aged 16 to 25 in
that population, it is clear that Detroit is suffering. The once glamourous melting pot that was
viewed as a city of everlasting opportunity has dealt with similar issues as other large cities but
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to a degree more severe than any in the United States. To combat the lack of education,
employment, and over-incarceration, revitalization efforts are underway. There are many, but
those that were discussed during the course of interviews are attempting to tackle the underlying
conditions that either contribute to mass incarceration or form as a result of issues such as mass
incarceration. Programs with efforts targeted at Detroit residents exist; some focus on
preventative programming while others offer support for those locked inside the system or just
being released to the community.
Fight Crime: Invest in Kids is an anti-crime organization that uses research to form
training for police academy recruits and in-service officers in attempts to improve police and
youth interactions. The organization which is made up of police chiefs, sheriffs (including
Sheriff Benny Napoleon), prosecutors and violence survivors devised a four-part plan to cut
crime and violence (Fight Crime: Invest in Kids, n.d.). Brilliant Detroit, which was co-founded
by Cindy Eggleton aims to create kid success neighborhoods that attempts to support families in
the Detroit communities that need it most by opening a home in every community that residents
can visit for support (Brilliant Detroit, n.d.). Other efforts in the city are attempting to remove the
label that mass incarceration has left such as Project Clean Slate which is an initiative to clear
Detroit residents criminal records and aide them in finding better employment opportunities
(Project Clean Slate, n.d.). The U.S. Department of Labor awarded Detroit a $5 million dollar
grant that will be geared towards returning citizens and training them for jobs as well as placing
them in readily available positions (Helms, 2015). What lies ahead for Detroit is unclear, but
recent revitalization efforts of the 140 square miles should undoubtedly continue to address the
impacts that localized mass incarceration has left on the city of Detroit.
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Mass incarceration has pervaded throughout the country and in its wake, the United
States is looked to as the country that imprisons the largest percentage of its population than any
other place in the world. The phenomenon of mass incarceration continues to be deconstructed
by scholars in an attempt to turn the tide and understand the various intricacies that lie at the
center of our carceral state. This paper attempts to explore those intricacies on a local level by
looking at Detroit, Michigan. The city of Detroit has been constantly restructured economically,
politically, racially, and socially throughout the years as the influx of African-Americans arrived
in the city looking to escape the perils of the Deep South. Years of struggles for housing, jobs,
and basic civil rights marked the city and created racial divide. The removal of the majority of
automobile manufacturing from the city center saw the removal of population as white Detroiters
field the city. The local police department once predominantly white and distrusted in the black
community due to police brutality or indifference underwent change with the election of Mayor
Coleman Young. The city could not escape the impact of mass incarceration however as national
and state crime policies began to hit Detroit communities and the minority community saw the
loss of young, black men to prison because of low-level drug charges who were subsequently
returned unskilled and uneducated. The economy fluctuations, crime policies, residual racial
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tensions, and fear of crime among other issues led to a city that constantly struggles. This paper
explores the issues Detroit has faced and continues to face and through the use of in-depth elite
interviews attempts to narrate what empirical data has shown; Detroit has seen significant
population change and the mass incarceration has contributed to the city’s decline. Results and
implications of the semi-structured interviews, crime data, and population data are discussed.
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